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Abstract:  
Our ideas about forgiveness seem to oscillate between idealization and scepticism. How 
should we make sense of this apparent conflict? This paper argues that we should learn 
something from each, seeing these views as representing opposing moments in a 
perennial and well-grounded moral ambivalence towards forgiveness. Once we are 
correctly positioned, we shall see an aspect of forgiveness that recommends precisely this 
ambivalence. For what will come into view will be certain key psychological 
mechanisms of moral-epistemic influence²other-addressed and self-addressed 
mechanisms of moral social construction²that enable forgiveness to function well when 
it is well-functioning, but which are also intrinsically prone to deterioration into one or 
another form of bad faith. Thus forgiveness is revealed as necessarily containing seeds of 
its own corruption, showing ambivalence to be a generically appropriate attitude. 
Moreover, it is emphasized that where forgiver and forgiven are relating to one another in 
the context of asymmetries of social power, the practice of forgiveness is likely to be 
further compromised, notably increasing the risk of negative influence on the moral-
epistemic states of either the forgiver or the forgiven, or both. 
 
 
 
Ambivalence About Forgiveness 
 
«:HZLOORQO\VKRXWZLWKMR\DQGNHHSVD\LQJµ,W¶VDOORYHU,W¶VDOORYHU¶ Listen 
WRPH1RUD<RXGRQ¶WVHHPWRUHDOLVHWKDWLWLVDOORYHU:KDWLVWKLV"²such a 
FROGVHWIDFH0\SRRUOLWWOH1RUD,TXLWHXQGHUVWDQG\RXGRQ¶WIHHODVLI\RX
could believe that I have forgiven you. But it is true, Nora, I swear it; I have 
forgiven you everything (Torvald Helmer to his wife Nora, in $'ROO¶V+RXVH by 
Henrik Ibsen) 
 
Our interpersonal practices of forgiveness are fragile and peculiarly prone to deformation 
of various kinds. Given this fragility, it is not surprising that in philosophy, as in moral 
thinking generally, we are somewhat prone to mixed attitudes towards forgiveness, being 
inclined now to idealize it as essential to moral life, and now to mistrust it as involving an 
inherently dishonest subterfuge. On the one hand we find philosophical accounts that 
carefully specify ideal forms of forgiveness as a strictly reasoned interpersonal moral 
justice or (in an alternative ideal) as a special magnanimity of a gracious heart1; yet on 
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 For the first ideal, VHHIRUH[DPSOH&KDUOHV*ULVZROG¶VSDUDGLJPRIIRUJLYHQHVVLQKLV
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the other hand there are also significant contemporary exponents of a Nietzschean 
pessimistic view that denigrates the whole business as a dishonest subterfuge, as one or 
another form of veiled, possibly self-deceived, interpersonal attack. In this latter 
connection, witness Martha 1XVVEDXP¶VUHFHQWunqualified excoriation: 
 
[T]he forgiveness process itself is violent toward the self. Forgiveness is an 
elusive and usually quite temporary prize held out at the end of a traumatic and 
profoundly intrusive process of self-denigration. To engage in it with another 
person (playing, in effect, the role of the confessor) intrXGHVLQWRWKDWSHUVRQ¶V
inner world in a way that is both controlling and potentially prurient, and does 
potential violHQFHWRWKHRWKHUSHUVRQ¶VVHOI.2 
 
In short, it seems that when it comes to forgiveness we move between admiration and 
suspicion. What should we make of this conflict? It could of course simply be a matter of 
one side being plain wrong, or of both sides talking past each other. However, I suspect 
that these views are best construed as opposing moments in a perennial moral 
ambivalence about forgiveness -- an ambivalence that is well grounded. At any rate, I aim 
locate a philosophical angle on forgiveness that brings into plain view what is right about 
each of these opposing perspectives. Once we are correctly positioned, we shall see an 
aspect of interpersonal forgiveness²considered as a change of heart that is normally 
though not necessarily communicated to the wrongdoer²which precisely recommends 
just such an attitude of ambivalence. For what will come into view will be certain key 
psychological mechanisms of moral influence²both other-addressed and self-
addressed²that enable forgiveness to function well when it is well-functioning, but 
which are also intrinsically prone to deterioration into one or another form of bad faith. 
In particular I hope to highlight that under circumstances of inequality forgiveness can all 
too easily descend into moral domination²a moral-epistemic wrong whereby one party 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Forgiveness: A Philosophical Exploration (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2007)IRUWKHVHFRQGVHHIRUH[DPSOH*OHQ3HWWLJURYH¶VQRWLRQRIµJUDFH¶LQKLV 
Forgiveness and Love (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012). 
2
 Martha C. Nussbaum (2016) Anger and Forgiveness: Resentment, Generosity, Justice 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press), 72-3. 
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has undue moral-epistemic influence over the other, steering them into seeing the 
VLWXDWLRQDFFRUGLQJWRWKHGRPLQDWRU¶V one-sided moral perspective. A dominating 
forgiver, moreover, will often do this in a manner that is peculiarly hard to recognize at 
the time, because it is in the very nature of forgiving someone that the emotional effort 
tends to suppress ERWKSDUWLHV¶ awareness of the power dynamic, as we shall see²the 
mechanisms of moral influence on which I shall be focussing are such as to cover their 
own tracks. To anticipate, the key psychological mechanism in question will emerge as 
an interpersonal social constructive power that is exerted (actively or passively; 
sometimes knowingly sometimes not; sometimes verbally, sometimes not) by the 
forgiver who communicates forgiveness to the wrongdoer. Granted that the forgiver is 
generally responding from a place of moral wounding, the social constructive powers 
operating as part of the communicative process of forgiveness have a tendency for 
deterioration, even corruption, so that it becomes compromised, and sometimes badly 
deformed. If we add into this interpersonal picture a social background such that people 
are responding to one another¶VPRUDOFODLPV in the context of unequal social power (like 
Nora and Torvald, the nineteenth-century bourgeois husband and wife protagonists of 
,EVHQ¶VIDPRXVSOD\WKHQ this significantly increases the risk that the forgiveness 
expressed (whether verbally or in some other way) will result in moral-epistemic 
domination. Power inequalities tend to magnify the risks of degeneration that I shall be 
depicting as already intrinsic to our practices of interpersonal forgiveness. I shall pay 
some attention to this example by way of illustration as things progress, but my core 
argument will not depend on issues of the contingent social inequalities between forgiver 
and forgiven, for my main claim will be a more functional one about some characteristic 
features intrinsic to central forms of forgiveness itself: that the reason why a certain 
ambivalence towards forgiveness is permanently in order is that the very business of 
forgiving is intrinsically susceptible to deterioration into manipulative and/or self-
deceived forms. While forgiveness plays a profoundly important role in moral life, and 
remains not only psychologically possible but perhaps all the more precious for its 
vulnerabilities; still an important fact about the key aspects of forgiveness I shall be 
bringing under scrutiny here is that they constitute respects in which the relevant kinds of 
forgiveness necessarily contain the seeds of their own corruption.  
 4 
 
Social constructive powers operating in blame: $µSroleptic mechanism¶ 
In order to bring into view the particular psychological mechanism internal to 
communicated forgiveness that is chiefly relevant to our purpose, I must first introduce 
the mechanism by way of its incarnation within blame. Communicating moral blame to a 
wrongdoer²understood as a matter of letting her know that you find moral fault with 
her, thereby effectively urging her, at least provisionally, to see matters more from your 
point of view²can serve as a fundamental means through which we either shore up 
existing shared moral understandings, or productively generate new ones. I believe that 
blame of this kind is crucial to how we maintain and grow shared moral consciousness.3 
But whatever one may think about this idea in relation to how best to theorize blame in 
general, all may accept that some such communicative practice of blame is capable of 
reaffirming existing shared moral meanings. This role can hardly be far from the surface 
of any communicated blame: I wrong you, and you communicate blame to me for it, 
thereby (at the very least) reminding me of any shared values I have transgressed. That 
communicated blame is at least sometimes capable of achieving this will not be 
controversial. 
 
What is less obvious is that communicated blame can involve a mechanism of social 
construction that belongs to the genus causal social construction: in treating X as if it 
(already) has feature F, one can thereby cause X to come to have feature F (at least to 
some degree). This is a broad phenomenon, and often discussed in connection with 
negative cases. Self-fulfilling stereotypes function this way, for instance. If, for example, 
a portion of the population is treated as if they are financially irresponsible (perhaps the 
usual terms of bank loans and credit cards are not made available to them), then they are 
liable to start acting in ways characteristic of the financially irresponsible.4 The causal 
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 Elsewhere I argue for this view in relation to what I call Communicative Blame²blame 
communicated in a manner suitable to elicit remorseful moral understanding on the part 
of the wrongdoer (see Fricker, µ:KDW¶VWKH3RLQWRI%ODPH"$3DUDGLJP%DVHG 
([SODQDWLRQ¶Noûs 50:1 (2014), 165-183). 
4 See 3HWHU36ZLUHµ(TXDOLW\RI2SSRUWXQLW\DQG,QYHVWPHQWLQ&UHGLWZRUWKLQHVV¶
University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 143/5 (1995); 1533-1559µDSHUVRQPD\
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power may operate in a way that is mediated attitudinally, or else it may operate more 
superficially and directly on behaviour, without any psychological mediation. Thus group 
members may respond to their financial exclusion with an attitude of defiant short-
WHUPLVPµ/HW¶VMXVWVSHQGit ZKLOHZH¶YHJRWLW²the whole systeP¶VVWDFNHGDJDLQVWXV
DQ\ZD\¶or they may have no such change of attitude, but simply be forced by 
circumstance into unfavourable practical options such as borrowing from loan sharks 
whose escalating interest rates make the loans impossible to re-pay, sending the 
borrowers into a spiral of debt. Either way, whether psychologically mediated or not, 
what we see in the behaviour is the effect of the self-fulfilling prophecy that is causal 
social construction. One way or the other the group is caused to go in for financially 
irresponsible behaviour²behaviour that infuriatingly provides an apparent retrospective 
justification for the original belief and treatment. Such scenarios are obviously highly 
negative for the group in question. More happily, however, there can also be positive 
self-fulfilling prophecies. In some circumstances, if you treat another person (not yet 
trustworthy) as if she were already trustworthy, then she may thereby be caused to 
become trustworthy. Indeed some have persuasively argued this is a general feature of 
trusting another person: other things equal, WKHIDFWWKDWRQHKDVSODFHGRQH¶VWUXVWLQ
them, thereby creating common knowledge that one is depending on them, gives the 
trusted party an added reason and motive to live up to that trust.5 When this happens, a 
morally useful piece of causal social construction has taken place interpersonally. 
 
Such interpersonal operations of causal social construction can occur in other areas of 
ethical life too. Following Bernard Williams¶OHDG I have elsewhere argued that 
communicated blame can effect just this kind of morally useful interpersonal social 
                                                                                                                                                                     
reasonably decide not to bother participating in a lending market that seems 
discriminatory. And, if a person is in fact approved for a loan in such a market, greater 
incentives exist to take the money and run, or at least not to strive so valiantly to pay on 
WLPH¶-4). I thank Boudewijn de Bruin for directing me to this work. For a virtue-
based account of the broader issues, see de Bruin Ethics and the Global Financial Crisis: 
Why Incompetence is Worse than Greed (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015). 
5
 See Richard Holtonµ'HFLGLQJWR7UXVW&RPLQJWR%HOLHYH¶Australasian Journal of 
Philosophy 72 (1994), 63-76; Paul Faulkner µ1RUPVRI7UXVW¶LQSocial Epistemology 
eds. A. Haddock, A. Millar, and D. Pritchard (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010); 
and Karen Jones µ7UXVWDVDQ$IIHFWLYH$WWLWXGH¶Ethics 107/1 (1996), 4-25. 
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construction.6 ,Q:LOOLDPV¶s exposition we encounter the idea that blame¶VH[SUHVVLRQ can 
sometimes have a salutary effect even on a relatively hard-case culprit by way of a 
µSUROHSWLFPHFKDQLVP¶. And I have argued that we should recognize this mechanism as a 
fundamental means by which we actively generate new shared moral understandings. 
When a proleptic mechanism functions within blame, the blamer treats the wrongdoer as 
if he already recognizes a reason (which he does not yet recognize), thereby causing him 
to come to recognize it.7 This proleptic mechanism will only work of course given the 
wrongdoer has sufficient basic respect for the blamer to be moved by his admonishments; 
but so long as that more basic respect is in place, then we see that the proleptic blamer is 
(possibly unwittingly) exercising a power of interpersonal moral social construction. 
Communicated blame operating proleptically, then, involves an exertion of moral 
influence that can ZRUNWREULQJWKHZURQJGRHU¶VPRUDOXQGHUVWDQGLQJLQWRDOLJQPHQW
with that of the wronged party. It is of course contingent how well this works in any 
given instance, but it surely must work much of the time, for otherwise it is hard to 
imagine how a genuinely shared moral culture could develop and stabilize itself 
interpersonally²without its powers to change people, blame communicated to those who 
do not already share the relevant values would have merely expressive or cathartic value 
                                                        
6 See Fricker, µ:KDW¶VWKH3RLQWRI%ODPH"$3DUDGLJP%DVHG([SODQDWLRQ¶Noûs 50:1 
(2014), 165-183; and Williams, µ,QWHUQDO5HDVRQVDQG7KH2EVFXULW\RI%ODPH¶LQ
Making Sense of Humanity and other philosophical papers 1982-1993 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1995). 
7
  See Williams µ,QWHUQDO5HDVRQVDQG7KH2EVFXULW\RI%ODPH¶LQMaking Sense of 
Humanity and other philosophical papers 1982-1993 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1995), 40-43. Williams does QRWXVHWKHWHUPµUHFRJQL]H¶RIFRXUVHZKLFKLVD
term of art on my part. In relation to practical reasons Williams generally used the verb 
µKDYH¶VLQFHKLVFRPPLWPHQWWRWKHGRFWUine of internal reasons pictures reasons as 
relativized to a semi-idealizHGVHWRIPRWLYDWLRQDOVWDWHVLQWKHDJHQWKHUµ6¶)URPWKLVLW
follows that the proper description of any case in which a proleptic mechanism has any 
real work to do must be given in terms of the wrongdoer actually lacking a reason the 
blamer might however cause him to acquire,Q:LOOLDPV¶VLGLRPWKHEDGWKLQJDERXW
really bad people is that they really lack moral reasons.) No doubt proleptic mechanisms 
FDQFDXVHVRPHRWKHUWKLQJVLQWKLVJHQHUDOYLFLQLW\UHDOL]LQJ,KDYHDUHDVRQ,GLGQ¶W
know I had, for instance, because the requisite motive was either already in my 
motivational set but concealed from me, or because it should have been there but owing 
WRDQHUURURIIDFWRUUHDVRQLQJRQP\SDUWZDVQ¶W 
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at best.8 Of course communicated blame is not the only resource for this purpose, but still 
without the spontaneous moral reactions of those we wrong, how would we learn the 
first-order moral significances of our actions in their vivid human colour? It is an 
important feature of well-functioning blame of this kind (µ&RPPXQLFDWLYH%ODPH¶as I 
call it)9 that it is not morally dogmatic. The attempt to get the person who has wronged 
you to see things more from your point of view is the natural means of getting them to 
acknowledge WKHPRUDOVLJQLILFDQFHRIZKDWWKH\¶YHGRQH. But the proper practice of this 
kind of blame carries no arrogant or narcissistic presumption on the part of the wronged 
party that her interpretation is unassailable²she is only human and may be over-reacting, 
or unaware of other aspects of the situation that put a different gloss on things. So the 
kind of blame appropriate to the morally constructive task will be communicated in a 
manner that is open to dialogue with the wrongdoer, on pain of moral dogmatism or 
manipulation. Victoria McGeer has discussed this issue in terms of a potential worry 
DERXWEODPH¶VµUHJXODWRU\¶UROHDQGVKHSURSRses a helpful test in this regard:  
 
To be respectful of you qua believer is to be respectful of you qua reasoning 
agent. But in order to be respectful of you in this way, it does not matter that I 
explicitly aim at getting you to change your beliefs; what matters is that I choose 
a means whereby your own rational faculties are the proximate cause of the 
change in your beliefs. That is to say I must offer you argument and/or evidence 
in favor of p«2QHVLJQLILFDQWDQGLPSRUWDQWWHVWRIWKLVIDFWLVWKDW\RXQRWRQO\
have the power to withhold your belief, but you have the power to challenge my 
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 Benjamin Bagley discusses these issues in a way WKDWHQYLVLRQVEODPH¶VSUROHSWLFDFWLRQ
DVDPDWWHURIUHWURVSHFWLYHO\UHQGHULQJGHWHUPLQDWHVRPHSDWFKRIWKHFXOSULW¶VQRUPDWLYH
psychology presumed to have previously been less than fully determinate. (See Bagley, 
µ3URSHUO\3UROHSWLF%ODPH¶Ethics 127 (2017), 852-882 (2017.) While I would agree that 
increasing psychological determinacy is indeed one modus operandi of prolepsis, and an 
important one to emphasize, still I do not regard it as the only one. In my view (and I 
EHOLHYHLQ:LOOLDPV¶Vconception) being blamed is one kind of experience that stands a 
chance of changing RQH¶VRXWORRNRUVHQVLELOLW\DGGLQJRUVXEWUDFWLQJDQLWHPLQRQH¶V6
or shifting the order of priority among existing items so as to produce new sound 
deliberative routes and thus new reasons for the agent. New experiences sometimes 
change us; new morally relevant experiences sometimes change us morally.  
9 Fricker, µ:KDW¶VWKH3RLQWRI%ODPH"$3DUDGLJP%DVHG([SODQDWLRQ¶ 
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arguments and my evidence, thereby exposing me to the very same process and 
possibilities to which I expose you²specifically the possibility of changing my 
mind as to the truth of p in light of your argumentative response.10 
 
Provided we can allow that an argumentatively inexplicit moral-emotional exchange can 
count as WKHUHOHYDQWVRUWRIµDUJXPHQW¶ RUµHYLGHQFH¶ that is required here, so that for 
instance your telling me (or perhaps merely showing me) that I hurt and offended you 
when I made some thoughtless quip is enough to count as your moral argument, and my 
feeling sorry and ashamed when I see how my stupid remark has upset you can count as 
sufficient for my own rational faculties being the proximate cause of the change in my 
EHOLHIVWKHQ0F*HHU¶VSURSRVHGWHVW strikes me as exactly right.11 It makes precise what 
LVDFKLHYHGLQWKHPRUHJHQHUDOFRQGLWLRQRIEODPH¶VEHLQJRSHQto dialogue and potential 
push-back on the part of the blamed party.  
 
So far so good: blame communicated with a view to getting the wrongdoer to appreciate 
WKHPRUDOVLJQLILFDQFHRIZKDWVKH¶VGRQHQHHGQRWEHGLVUHVSHFWIXOGRJPDWLFRU
bullying. But still, what of its pitfalls? It is generally fairly close to the surface of any 
communicated blame that it is prone to deteriorated formations: excessive anger, 
retributive impulse, high-handedness, moralism, ressentiment, and so forth. We are on the 
whole only too aware of these risks in everyday moral interaction; hence the popular 
suspicion of blame as a moral response. However, the present focus is not on the merits 
RUGHPHULWVRIWKLVRUWKDWNLQGRIEODPHEXWUDWKHURQEODPH¶Vsheer capacity to operate 
proleptically by way of an interpersonal psychological mechanism whose generic form I 
have suggested we should recognize as that of causal social construction, and the inherent 
riskiness that this introduces²riskiness as regards the likelihood that any given blamer, 
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 9LFWRULD0F*HHUµ&LYLOL]LQJ%ODPH¶LQBlame: Its Nature and Norms eds. D. Justin 
Coates and Neil A. Tognazzini (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 179. 
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 Insisting on more explicitly articulate moral argumentation would seem intellectualist, 
DQGQRWLQWKHVSLULWRI0F*HHU¶VJHQHUDO6WUDZVRQLDQ approach; so I take myself, I hope 
FRUUHFWO\WREHSUHVHQWLQJ0F*HHU¶VVHOIVDPHYLHZZKHQ,VWUHWFKWKHQRWLRQVRI
µDUJXPHQWDWLRQ¶µHYLGHQFH¶DQGRZQµSUR[LPDOUHDVRQV¶WRHQFRPSDVVWKHUDWLRQDO
sensitivities that are expressed in an exchange of spontaneous moral reactive attitudes and 
feelings.  
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coming from a place of moral wounding, will step over the mark and be less open to 
dialogue than they should be. Proleptic blame, in virtue of its ambition to change the 
other party, is a highly valuable moral response to wrongdoing; and yet the very power in 
which its special value inheres runs a special risk that the wounded party may bully the 
wrongdoer into a one-sided view of the putative wrong done, and thus effect a moment of 
moral-epistemic domination. 
 
This proleptic mode of blame and its attendant risk indicates where we should look for 
our desired angle on forgiveness: Might forgiveness sometimes involve a proleptic 
mechanism too? If it does, or inasmuch as it does, then I think we may locate the position 
from which to view forgiveness so that the two conflicting perspectives on it²now 
admiration, even idealization; now mistrust, even cynicism²are resolved into one 
complex image of an essential human response to wrongdoing whose second-personal 
communication normally involves, consciously or not, an operation of moral influence on 
the other party. Ambivalence will prove to be in order because, as with most exercises of 
power, however benignly intended or plain unwitting, there is a built-in risk of tipping 
over into morally problematic forms such as moral-epistemic domination. Let me now 
explore the different proleptic moments in our practices of forgiving, so that we may be 
led to some answers about what forms of bad faith are perpetually in the offing when we 
forgive.  
 
Proleptic moral powers implicit in forgiveness 
Now we have introduced the idea of a significant power of other-directed moral-social 
construction that can operate in communicated blame, we have a lens that will help us 
discern similar proleptic moments secreted in the structures forgiveness. What might 
these be? Let us scrutinize what I take to be the two main kinds of forgiveness, both of 
which essentially involve an attitudinal change towards the wrongdoer that may or may 
not be communicated. First, a µconditional¶ kind according to which the forgiveness is 
earned or justified WKURXJKUHPRUVHDQGRUDSRORJ\RQWKHFXOSULW¶VSDUW12; and an 
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 For some recent views of this kind see Charles L. Griswold, Forgiveness: A 
Philosophical Exploration (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Pamela 
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essentially µunconditional¶, or µelective¶ kind where the forgiveness is precisely un-
earned RUµXQPHULWHG¶, its distinctive moral value consisting largely in this fact.13 I trust I 
can take these two broad types as understood and recognizable from everyday life as well 
as from the philosophical literature that details their possible contours. At any rate, for a 
theoretically minimal working model of the first kind²the earned kind of forgiveness 
that waits for (something approximating) remorseful apology²let us rely on P. F. 
6WUDZVRQ¶VFKDUDFWHUL]DWLRQRIWKHµUHDFWLYHDWWLWXGHDQGIHHOLQJ¶RIIRUJLYHQHVV. He 
characterises it as essentially involving the IRUJLYHU¶Vforswearing of (what I shall 
neutrally gloss as) blame-feelings towards the wrongdoer once the wrongdoer has offered 
a repudiation of the wrong done: 
 
To ask to be forgiven is in part to acknowledge that the attitude displayed in our 
actions was such as might properly be resented and in part to repudiate that 
DWWLWXGHIRUWKHIXWXUH«DQGto forgive is to accept the repudiation and to 
forswear the resentment.14  
 
This kind of forgiveness, let us notice in passing, might be seen to carry a risk that the 
demanding attitude it waits on becomes excessive or controlling (µ/HW¶VKHDUWKDW
repudiation loud and clear²tell me just how wicked \RX¶YHEHHQ!¶). This is the 
corruption that Nussbaum rightly draws critical attention to. It has nothing to do with 
proleptic mechanisms, but rather the tendency for conditional forgiveness to become 
blame-ridden, so that the forgiveness invisibly straightens into another stick to beat the 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Hieronymiµ$UWLFXODWLQJDQ8QFRPSURPLVLQJ)RUJLYHQHVV¶Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research Vol. LXII, No. 3 May (2001), 529-555; Jeffrie Murphy in 
Jean Hampton and Jeffrie Murphy, Forgiveness and Mercy (Cambridge University Press, 
1998); Christopher Bennett, µ3HUVRQDODQG5HGHPSWLYH)RUJLYHQHVV¶, European Journal 
of Philosophy 11:2 (2003), 127-144; among many others. 
13
 For some recent views of this kind see Pettigrove, Forgiveness and Love (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2012); Lucy Allais µ:LSLQJWKH6ODWH&OHDQ7KH+HDUWRI
)RUJLYHQHVV¶Philosophy and Public Affairs 36:1 (2008), 33-68; and µ(OHFWLYH
)RUJLYHQHVV¶International Journal of Philosophical Studies (2013), 1-17; and Eve 
*DUUDUGDQG'DYLG0F1DXJKWRQµ,Q'HIHQFHRI8QFRQGLWLRQDO)RUJLYHQHVV¶
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 103:1 (2004), 39-60. 
14 3)6WUDZVRQµ)UHHGRPDQG5HVHQWPHQW¶LQFreedom and Resentment and Other 
Essays (London: Methuen, 1974); 6 (italics added). 
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wrongdoer with. Later we shall see that this tendency to become blame-ridden is in fact a 
risk that adheres to any kind of forgiveness that is spoken, but for the time being let us 
note that the particular form of corruption that Nussbaum highlights is less a corruption 
of the forgiveness itself but rather of the blame that is its condition and precursor. For as 
soon as the proper business of forgiving²namely the forswearing of blame-feeling²is 
under way, the intrusive excess that Nussbaum characterizes as potentially involving a 
kind of psychological violence is by definition already over. But even if we allow that the 
EODPHU¶VGHPDQGLVDOVRSDUWDQGSDUFHORIWKHIRUJLYHU¶VVWDQFH, which perhaps it is, still I 
see no reason to agree with her blanket view that all kinds of forgiveness require the 
fulfilment of demands that are intrusive or moralistic, let alone psychologically violent. 
There is no reason to lose faith in the possibility of gentler, generous, and non-
excessively demanding forms of conditional forgiveness; though we certainly do well to 
heed her warning about the risks. 
 
This much I find to be somewhat on the surface of our practices and not concealed²
largely for the reason just mentioned, namely that the corruptions of conditional 
forgiveness as regards what it does to the wrongdoer are really corruptions internal to the 
communicated blame that precedes it, and we are generally alive to the likely corruptions 
of blame. What is more opaque, I believe, is how the second kind of forgiveness²an 
unconditional kind of forgiveness I shall call Gifted Forgiveness15²may itself be prone 
to deterioration into forms of moral dogmatism and manipulation. It looks rather unlikely 
on the surface, because the whole point about any unconditional forgiveness is that its 
distinctive feature is its non-demandingness towards the culprit. The gifting forgiver 
demands no repudiation of the wrong. Rather he abstains from the normal entitlements of 
the wounded party in relation to a wrongdoer, and forgives anyway, even though the 
normal conditions of forgiveness are not satisfied. For this reason some aptly describe 
this kind of forgiveness as involving an µunmerited¶ act of grace.16 So if the gifting 
forgiver just lets the culprit go free in this way, without moral demand, then it seems 
                                                        
15
 See Fricker, µ)RUJLYHQHVV$Q2UGHUHG3OXUDOLVP¶Australian Philosophical Review 
(forthcoming). 
16 Glen Pettigrove, Forgiveness and Love (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 
chapter 7. 
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obscure how such a practice would have any features that render it intrinsically prone to 
descend into any kind of moral-epistemic bullying. But I believe our newly acquired 
awareness of the subtle operation of proleptic mechanisms in moral relations promises to 
shine some light on this relative obscurity. 
 
In Gifted Forgiveness the distinctive feature, as we have just remarked, is that the 
wronged party forgives for free; that is, without demanding any prior repudiation of the 
wrong. Thus Gifted Forgiveness is given as an arrestingly generous, because normatively 
transgressive, moral gratuity. Now, what we have not yet observed about this 
phenomenon is that this norm-busting moral gratuity tends to induce a certain effect in 
the forgiven party: the gift-forgiven wrongdoer, in recognizing the transgressively 
generous nature of the gift, may be jolted after the fact into the humility that ushers in 
remorseful recognition of her wrongdoing. Gifted Forgiveness, exploiting as it does a 
background common knowledge that some sort of repudiation is the normal condition on 
appropriate forgiveness, is structured perfectly to exert a power of moral-social 
construction: if we look carefully we can discern that the structure of this interpersonal 
moral exchange is the already familiar one of prolepsis. In this case the proleptic 
mechanism is as follows: the gifting forgiver effectively treats the wrongdoer as if she 
already satisfied the normal condition on appropriate forgiveness, thereby causing her (if 
the mechanism achieves its end) to fulfil that very condition after all.  
 
The gift in Gifted Forgiveness is not merely the commitment to direct no (further) blame-
feelings towards the wrongdoer for what they have done, though that is surely part of it. 
Rather the gift more importantly includes a commitment to a morally optimistic 
SHUFHSWLRQRIWKHZURQJGRHUDVVRPHRQHZKRµNQRZVEHWWHU¶RUµNQRZVEHWWHUreally¶
and who is therefore capable of repudiating the wrong they have done and perhaps acting 
differently in the future. Proleptic forgiveness directly DGGUHVVHVLWVHOIWRWKHZURQJGRHU¶V
better nature. 0RUHRYHUWKHJLIWLQJIRUJLYHU¶V cart-before-horse forswearing of blame-
feeling affirms the possibility, perhaps the KRSHWKDWWKHZURQJGRHU¶V better nature may 
soon actually come to the fore, somewhat precipitated by the very fact of having been 
forgiven in this normatively transgressive, un-earned manner. I trust this underlines the 
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fact that the kind of power exercised by the gifting forgiver (whether he knows it or not, 
intends it or not) is indeed a power of causal moral-social construction: in treating the 
wrongdoer as if they already fulfilled the condition of conditional forgiveness he causes 
them to fulfil it (if they do) after the fact. Here we discern the generally morally 
progressive proleptic mechanism detected in the very structure of Gifted Forgiveness.  
 
Before we move on to the ways in which this mechanism creates a risk of deterioration 
into moral domination, let me emphasize two points regarding what is meant by the idea 
of the proleptic mechaniVPEHLQJµEXLOWLQ¶WRWKHSUDFWLFH)LUVWDSUDFWLFHKDYLQJ a 
proleptic power built into its structure does not entail that it always, or even ordinarily, 
achieves its point. The aim built into the structure RIVRORFDUGJDPHVRIµVROLWDLUH¶RU
µSDWLHQFH¶LVWRJHWDOOWKHsuits to work out in sequence; but that only actually happens 
about half the time, if that. Or consider another ethical practice, briefly mentioned earlier: 
trusting someone WRGRVRPHWKLQJ2QH¶VWUXVWZLOOFHUWDLQO\QRW always have the effect 
that the practice aims at, but still the rationale of the practice depends on the idea that it is 
well designed to have the effect, other things equal. So it is, I am suggesting, with Gifted 
Forgiveness. Just like trusting someone to do something, gift forgiving will tend, other 
things equal, to bring about a certain morally desirable psychological effect. There are 
limits to the analogy of course. I would not wish to insist, for instance, that the act of 
Gifted Forgiveness provides the wrongdoer with an added moral reason to repudiate her 
wrongs (though it surely might in some contexts); but certainly the analogy holds in that 
the act of Gifted Forgiving, like the act of trusting, is apt to move the forgiven party in 
the morally desirable direction. It is not guaranteed²far from it²but the practice is 
culturally evolved to tend towards this effect. Indeed, as Glen Pettigrove has argued, 
there is some empirical evidence for a fairly high estimation of WKHµWUDQVIRUPDWLYH 
SRZHU¶RIWKLVNLQGRIIRUJLYHQHVVZKLFKKHFRQFHLYHVDVLQYROYLQJDQDFWRIJUDFH
understood as an act of unmerited favour).17  
 
The second point concerns WKHIRUJLYHU¶VPRUDOPRWLYDWLRQVAlso like trust, while Gifted 
Forgiveness may be practised entirely non-strategically and guilelessly as regards the 
                                                        
17 Pettigrove, Forgiveness and Love; 126, and see also 140 nn. 57 & 58. 
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proleptic power it contains, still there need be nothing manipulative or ungenerous, let 
alone bullying, about a clear-eyed forgiver who did engage in the practice in full 
consciousness of its implicit rationale, or even who employed it as a deliberate moral 
strategy. Such a clear-eyed gift forgiver might simply see that gifting the forgiveness is 
the best-bet response in a case where anything else is only going to entrench moral 
hostilities. Forgiveness can be somewhat strategic without thereby being manipulative, 
for having a moral strategy in how to deal with a difficult situation²for instance one in 
which someone has wronged you but is only likely to get more hostile if you confront 
them about it²is manifestly an instance of moral wisdom. A good deal of our moral lives 
LVDPDWWHURIFRSLQJZLWKHDFKRWKHU¶VPoral limitations, including our own, so the 
everyday strategies²ethical common sense, one might say²about how best to handle 
this or that situation of wrongdoing, hurt feelings, on-going vulnerabilities and 
resistances is part and parcel of wise moral response. The bottom line, as with blame, is 
that provided the Gifted Forgiveness prompts the wrongdoer to an appropriate remorseful 
moral understanding of which a proximal cause is her own moral sensibility (which 
might simply be a matter of her coming to IHHOWUXO\VRUU\DVDUHVXOWRIWKHEODPHU¶V
EULQJLQJKHUWRDPRUHUHDOLVWLFDQGYLYLGSHUFHSWLRQRIWKHKXUWVKH¶GFDXVHGKLP), then 
there need be nothing manipulative or ungenerous about the proleptic purpose. 
 
This completes the case for the claim that Gifted Forgiveness inherently operates a 
proleptic mechanism, whether actively employed by a savvy forgiver whose pity for the 
wrongdoer contains the knowledge that nothing else can help him now but the gratuitous 
generosity of the person wronged, or merely passively operative through a forgiver who 
is entirely focussed on a personal ethical ideal of a wilfully open heart. As ever, the 
particular moral-cultural formation of Gifted Forgiveness is highly contingent, capable of 
manifesting itself in a religious form, or in a secular one; perhaps a formation that is 
primarily focussed on the moral health of the forgiver, or alternatively on that of the 
wrongdoer, or of course both. Either way, this kind of communicated Gifted Forgiveness 
is invested with a power of causal moral-epistemic social construction that is apt to 
prompt the wrongdoer to repudiate her bad action after the fact. I have argued that this 
prompting depends upon the wrongdoer being moved by the norm-busting generosity 
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displayed by the forgiver who does not demand repudiation up front but rather forgives as 
a matter of moral gratuity; and I have argued that it need not be manipulative, even when 
it is part of a self-conscious moral strategy. However, with the potency of this 
psychological dynamic put before us, I hope we are now better positioned to see how this 
kind of forgiveness is nonetheless intrinsically susceptible to deterioration into something 
that is manipulative, and potentially a form of moral-epistemic domination. 
 
Corruptions of proleptic powers 
Let us start with the obvious point that Gifted Forgiveness is a special kind of gift giving. 
The general comparison is instructive, for the giving of gifts needs to be done in the right 
spirit. Quite what the right spirit requires will vary from context to context. But, for 
example, in contexts where there is a general background presumption of reciprocation 
other things equal, giving something in the right spirit will depend on achieving a certain 
delicate balance between simple generosity LW¶VIRUthem) and a perfectly proper 
background awareness that this sort of thing is generally reciprocal (maybe if they never 
gave you a present in return, you might stop bothering to get them one²WKDW¶GEHIDLU
enough; and anyway it might be socially ill-judged, even mildly coercive, to persist). The 
giving of Birthday presents can be like this in a given circle of friends. But too much 
motivational focus on the prospect of receiving something in return instrumentalizes 
generosity, and your gift is rendered a travesty. In other contexts, the expectation of like-
for-like reciprocation may not be at issue, but rather some other kind of obliquely 
expected goal that is lodged in the rationale of the practice. In Gifted Forgiveness the 
releYDQWH[SHFWDWLRQZLOOFRQFHUQWKHIRUJLYHQSDUW\¶VSRWHQWLDOSURPSWLQJLQWRa 
repudiation of KHUEDGDFWLRQ+HUHWKHµULJKWVSLULW¶UHTXLUHVPDLQWDLQLQJDEDODQFH
between forgiving out of generosity but in the context of a (perhaps not-so-background) 
awareness that this may prompt a change in the wrongdoer. As regards the aim of 
successfully pricking the conscience of the wrongdoer, quite how much motivational 
prominence can be tolerated in a given context without spoiling the proper spirit of moral 
generosity will surely vary with the situation and relationship. (There are some contexts 
in which the only non-VSRLOLQJDQVZHUWRWKHTXHVWLRQµ:K\GLG\RXIRUJLYHPH"¶ZRXOG
EHµ%HFDXVH\RX¶UHP\ friend¶2WKHUVLQZKLFKLWZRXOGEHSHUIHFWO\ILQHWRVD\µ%HFDXVH
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,FRXOGVHHWKDWQRWKLQJHOVHZDVJRLQJWRJHWXVDQ\ZKHUH¶18) However we can say that 
in any given case, too much motivational emphasis on the aim of changing the wrongdoer 
risks over-instrumentalizing the forgiveness and thereby spoiling the spirit of moral 
generosity of which, at its best, it is the open-hearted expression: too much trying to 
change others descends into manipulation and even an attempt at moral-epistemic 
domination. The spirit of even the savviest, most influence-aware gifting forgiver is not 
one of pulling the strings of puppet wrongdoers. And relatedly, as in the case of 
communicated blame, the well-functioning practice of communicated Gifted Forgiving 
gives no shelter to moral dogmatism. Rather it remains open to dialogue and pushback 
from the wrongdoer. So the balance of generosity and attempted moral influence that is 
inherent in any Gifted Forgiving is a delicate one. Maintaining the right spirit involves 
resisting two closely related deteriorations: the over-instrumentalization that would cast 
RQH¶VIRUJLYHQHVV too much as a mere means of securing the desired moral response from 
the wrongdoer; and the closedness to dialogue that amounts to moral dogmatism as 
regards the content of the moral-epistemic perspective one hopes to bring them to take 
up. The attitude behind well-functioning Gifted Forgiving might often be one of 
hopefulness (that the wrongdoer will come around), and even moral confidence about 
RQH¶VLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRIHYHQWVyet, as in the case of communicative blaming, that 
confidence is partly earned through a continued openness to dialogue (as regards the 
moral content of the claim of wrongdoing)DQGDZLOOLQJQHVVWRUHYLVHRQH¶V
interpretation of events where countervailing responses are forthcoming.19 
 
These balanced attitudes are difficult to maintain interpersonally at the best of times. If 
we add to this the fact that the forgiver will always be coming from a place of some 
moral wounding, then we see all the more clearly how easily the proleptic power implicit 
in Gifted Forgiveness can descend into attempted moral domination. Let us imagine a 
situation in which the Gifting Forgiver is forgiving a genuine wrong done in a context of 
social equality. Perhaps we can imagine two friends, whose relationship is not 
                                                        
18
 I thank David Enoch for a helpful discussion of these issues.  
19
 +HUHDVHDUOLHU,DPLQGHEWHGWR0F*HHU¶VGLVFXVVLRQRIWKHµUHJXODWLRQ¶ZRUU\LQ
relation to blame (McGeer µ&LYLOL]LQJ%ODPH¶). 
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characterized by any notable inequalities of social power, where one has betrayed the 
other in some way, and the wronged party aims to forgive her friend even though Friend 
(let us call her) does not seem to be fully acknowledging what she has done, and indeed 
there is some question in the mind of the forgiver as to whether Friend is in some denial 
about its moral seriousness. In a situation like this, the forgiver may hope that Friend, in 
being gift forgiven, might be prompted to acknowledge the full significance of the 
betrayal. So far so all right. And yet it is not difficult to see how this could easily descend 
into something less well-balanced and more controlling, as our forgiver might be 
frustrated by what she sees as FULHQG¶s under-estimation of the wrong, and repeatedly 
communicates her magnanimous gesture of forgiveness as a means to prompt Friend into 
some sort of moral realization that matches the forgiver¶VSHUFHSWLRQRIWKLQJV. What 
begins as a legitimate hopeful effort of moral influence can all too easily intensify, when 
insufficiently dialogically open, into an excessive emphasis on the goal of prompting a 
preconceived desired change in the moral-epistemic states of the wrongdoer. Where there 
is interpersonal moral dogmatism there is manipulation, and in some cases to a degree 
that merits description as moral-epistemic domination. 
 
This is especially so if we take seriously the possibility that Friend, considered by the 
hurt party to be under-estimating the moral seriousness of her conduct, may not be so 
much in denial as in a state of some genuine disagreement about the moral significance of 
her behaviour. The moral meanings of our actions are often contested and up for 
negotiation. µ,DGPLWthat what I did was pretty thoughtless, but to say it was a ³betrayal 
of our friendship´ is melodramatic« But now I GRQ¶WHYHQKDYHWKHFKDQFHWRGLVFXVVLW 
because apparently ,DP³already foUJLYHQ´.¶) How does our supposedly generously fast-
tracked forgiveness look now that we see it in this light? Its would-be generous one-
sidedness seems to have deteriorated into a technique of silencing the other party and 
imposing a one-sided moral interpretation. Here the wrongdoer is paying a price for the 
very absence of moral demand²demand for upfront repudiation and therefore the 
opportunity for dialogue²that the practice frames as an act of generosity towards her. In 
such a case, the Gifted Forgiveness may be entirely well-intentioned and yet it is 
facilitating an inadvertent act of moral-epistemic domination. (We can easily imagine 
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cases that are less well-intentioned and less inadvertent too of course.) The ever-present 
risk in the great one-sided emotional efforts of the Gifting Forgiver is that she simply by-
passes the opportunity for moral dialogue and contestation that communicated blame is 
likely to openly inspire.20 Thus we see how Gifted Forgiveness can be employed, whether 
innocently or strategically, to pre-empt dialogue and thereby to impose the hurt paUW\¶V
moral interpretation in a way that renders it somewhat immune to challenge. The 
purported wrongdoer who might have gladly taken up an opportunity to challenge the 
IRUJLYHU¶VPRUDO-epistemic perspectives is effectively pre-empted, wrong-footed, perhaps 
altogether silenced.  
 
Interestingly this kind of moral-epistemic domination through pre-emptive Gift Forgiving 
can occur even in cases where the Gifted Forgiveness is not communicated to them. 
Imagine someone with something of a martyr complex privately Gift Forgiving another 
who they feel has wronged them; yet where the best interpretation of their magnanimous 
one-sided and secret gift is that they are thereby protecting themselves from any dialogue 
that might challenge the idea that they have been wronged. The purported wrongdoer in 
this scenario may not even be aware that she is regarded as having done something 
wrong, and yet she is already forgiven for it²the nature of her alleged moral crime thus 
self-servingly fixed in the psychology of the forgiver. 
 
Even between two subjects of roughly equal social power and status, this much flows all 
too naturally from the very nature of Gifted Forgiveness as a one-sided fast-tracked form 
of forgiveness that speeds past the usual stage of communicated blame and the dialogue it 
invites. Add into this cocktail a twist of social inequality between the two parties, and 
things are likely to deteriorate further. In situations of greater social power on the part of 
the forgiver, his communication of Gifted Forgiveness will wield undue moral-epistemic 
influence on the alleged ZURQJGRHUEHFDXVHOHW¶VLPDJLQHZHDUHLQbourgeois circles in 
a nineteenth-century Norwegian town DQGWKHIRUJLYHULVWKHµKXVEDQG¶ who is master in 
his home DQGWKHZURQJGRHUKLVµZLIH¶,Q7RUYDOGDQG1RUD¶VFDVHas quoted in my 
epigraph, he is forgiving her for something authentically culpable²she committed a 
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 I thank Antony Duff and Christel Fricke for discussion of this point. 
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significant crime (fraud) that exposed them to blackmail. Happily the blackmail threat 
swiftly abated, though not before Torvald had been decidedly foul to Nora so that the 
scales fell from her eyes as regards the meaning of their marriage and of her imposed 
infantilized existence. As the master of the house, Torvald exercises an unduly inflated 
authority in general, and this looks ready to spill over into their moral exchange. For 
much of the play one might find both Torvald and Nora pretty insufferable, but even if 
they had both already been feminists of their time there would be limits to how far they 
could expunge the patriarchy from their relationship, for it is delivered in the gendered 
identities they are lumbered with, and in the institution of marriage that rigidifies and 
incentivizes them. (One recalls John SWXDUW0LOO¶Vstatement in which he repudiated the 
µRGLRXVSRZHUV¶FRQIHUUHGRQKLPLQPDUU\LQJ Harriet Taylor and lamented the 
impossibility of legally divesting himself of them.) Even when the parties dissent, the 
social statuses in which one is operating still tend to insinuate themselves through the 
passive operation of identity power.21 Despite best efforts, the very relationships we stand 
in can unbalance the everyday forms of moral influence that would otherwise (in a 
situation of equality) be more straightforward and candid. Even if you are critically aware 
of those unequal social statuses, still the forgiveness that may flow between you and 
another is likely to be compromised in some measure. Perhaps you presume too easily 
that if someone does not repudiate their action then they are surely in denial, or plain 
wrong; or perhaps you presume too much as regards the credentials of your moral 
interpretations, and wind up imposing them on others who are not enabled to challenge 
you effectively. At any rate, the point is simply that whatever risk of descent into moral 
manipulation already inheres in the proleptic mechanism as wielded by someone who has 
been morally wounded, it is likely to become heightened if for reasons of social power 
the forgiver exercises an asymmetrical moral authority.  
 
Let us stay with Torvald and Nora for a moment longer to see what else we may observe 
regarding WKLVVXEMHFWRI*LIWHG)RUJLYHQHVV¶VGHWHULRUDWLRQLQWRDWRRORIPRUDO-epistemic 
domination when operating in a context of unequal power. Here we find them at the 
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 ,VHWRXWWKHLGHDRIµLGHQWLW\SRZHU¶LQFKDSWHURIEpistemic Injustice: Power and the 
Ethics of Knowing (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). 
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moment when Torvald has discovered they are released from the threat of blackmail to 
ZKLFK1RUD¶VFULPHKDGH[SRVHGthem: 
 
Torvald«:HZLOORQO\VKRXWZLWKMR\DQGNHHSVD\LQJ³,W¶VDOORYHU,W¶VDOO
RYHU´/LVWHQWRPH1RUD<RXGRQ¶WVHHPWRUHDOLVHWKDWLWLVDOORYHU:KDWLV
this?²VXFKDFROGVHWIDFH0\SRRUOLWWOH1RUD,TXLWHXQGHUVWDQG\RXGRQ¶W
feel as if you could believe that I have forgiven you. But it is true, Nora, I swear 
it; I have forgiven you everything. I know that what you did, you did out of love 
for me. 
 
Nora: That is true. 
 
Torvald: You have loved me as a wife ought to love her husband. Only you had 
not sufficient knowledge to judge of the means you used. But do you suppose you 
are DQ\WKHOHVVGHDUWRPHEHFDXVH\RXGRQ¶WXQGHUVWDQGKRZWRDFWRQ\RXURZQ
responsibility? No, no; only lean on me; I will advise you and direct you. I should 
not be a man if this womanly helplessness did not just give you a double 
attractiveness in my eyes. You must not think anymore about the hard things I 
said in my first moment of consternation, when I thought everything was going to 
overwhelm me. I have forgiven you, Nora; I swear to you I have forgiven you. 
 
 
Something that is very noticeable here is that Torvald is operating with a rigid 
presumption that he knows exactly what has gone on morally, showing zero interest in 
anything Nora might have to say on the subject. He prattles on, presuming she has 
nothing to contribute besides perhaps contrition and gratitude. Torvald¶VVSRQWDQHRXV
forgiveness (I doQ¶WVD\LW¶VH[DFWO\ Gifted Forgiveness²he may or may not be 
presuming she is remorseful as he pays so little heed to the idea of her as a moral agent) 
pre-empts the possibility of achieving any genuinely shared moral understanding of what 
has gone on between him and his wife. Instead he is only interested in his own 
understanding, and just assumes Nora will see things his way. That is what he is used to 
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doing in every other area of their life, and so it is presumed here. Of course we know that 
Nora ultimately refuses all this, and the only way she can communicate it is by leaving 
with the famous final door slam. What is somewhat on display in this passage, I would 
suggest, is the closedness to dialogue that we have identified as signifying moral-
epistemic manipulation. Chez Torvald and Nora this stems largely from the social 
institutions of gender and marriage, and the way in which he has all along constructed her 
as barely responsible or able to think for herself²a performance of gender ideology in 
which she has so far actively colluded. These contemporary kinds of unequal social 
identity positions²µKXVEDQG¶ZKRLVPDVWHUDQGSURWHFWRUµZLIH¶ZKRLVREHGLHQWDQG
protected²play directly into the hands of the intrinsic tendencies for corruption already 
identified in the very psychological mechanisms of Gifted Forgiving. Those intrinsic 
tendencies chart twin patterns of deterioration: what may start as a candid attempt at 
respectful moral influence descends into manipulation, even moral-epistemic domination; 
and what starts with a generous sparing of the wrongdoer from the travails of 
condemnation deteriorates into the silencing of potential moral contestation. 
 
Other Intrinsic Tendencies Toward Deteriorated Forgiving²%ODPH¶V5HWXUQ 
I have so far been focusing exclusively on the likely corruptions that come from 
something special to Gifted Forgiveness, namely the other-directed proleptic mechanism 
that is internal to it. I would like in this last section to broaden our purview a little and 
look for other tendencies towards deterioration that may be either essential or at least 
normal features of forgiveness in general²that is, conditional forgiveness as well as the 
central kind of unconditional forgiveness that is Gifted Forgiving. The first point I shall 
discuss was briefly flagged at the outset in relation to all communicated forgiving and 
does not depend on any prolepsis. Instead it stems from an observation about the power 
of presupposition²specifically here its power to render expressions of forgiveness 
surreptitiously blame-ridden. The second point will return us to proleptic mechanisms, 
but not of the familiar other-directed kind, but rather to a kind that is intriguingly self-
directed²a moment of reflexive causal moral-social construction that is often involved 
in the forswearing of blame-feelings, whether expressed or kept private. 
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First, the power of presupposition. Forgiveness in general presupposes that the person to 
be forgiven is blameworthy. Though possibly not an absolutely universal rule, it would be 
a rare scenario in which one would be in a position to forgive someone who was not at 
fault and so blameworthy for their actions.22 So the presupposition of blameworthiness is 
generally apt²part of the generic logic of forgiveness. But presuppositions can be 
unruly²noisier than they are intended or pretended to be, and insidiously influential. Rae 
Langton discusses the introduction of presuppositions into conversational contexts in 
teUPVRIµEDFN-door WHVWLPRQ\¶.23 Her particular interest is in how back-door testimony of 
an objectionable kind²it might be prejudiced speech, for instance²FDQEHµEORFNHG¶ 
DQGKRZLILWLVQ¶WEORFNHGWKHQLWZLQGVXSHIIHFWLYHO\ µDFFRPPRGDWHG¶$FFRPPRGDWLRQ 
keeps the presupposition in play as something all parties to the conversation have at least 
passively allowed in. Back-door testimony takes a significant effort of conversational 
disruption to block, for one has to first make the presupposition explicit and then 
challenge it. This amounts to stopping the conversational action µ&ut!¶and forcing 
something into shot whose presence was intended to be only obliquely sensed off-screen. 
Such challenges are not always easy; though they certainly can be made, as Langton 
illustrates: 
 
$WWHPSWVWREORFNFDQEH«PXQGDQHOLNHWKLVOLJKW-hearted and high-decibel exchange I 
witnessed in 1990, at a Melbourne football game: 
6W.LOGDVXSSRUWHUWRVOXJJLVKSOD\HUµ*HWon with it, Laurie, you great girl¶ 
$OHUWE\VWDQGHUµ+H\ZKDW¶VZURQJZLWKDJLUO"¶ 
6W.LOGDVXSSRUWHUµ,W¶VJRWno ballsWKDW¶VZKDW¶VZURQJZLWKLW¶24 
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 Espen Gamlund has argued that we can make sense of forgiving someone even for a 
wrong that was wholly excused (see Gamlund µ)RUJLYHQHVV:LWKRXW%ODPH¶LQ&KULVWHO
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Review 126:2 (2017), 241-272). 
23 5DH/DQJWRQµ%ORFNLQJDV&RXQWHU-6SHHFK¶New Work on Speech Acts, ed. Daniel 
Harris, Daniel Fogal, and Matt Moss (New York: Oxford University Press, forthcoming). 
/DQJWRQGUDZVH[SOLFLWO\RQ'DYLG/HZLV¶VQRWLRQRIµUXOHVRIDFFRPPRGDWLRQ¶LQ
µ6FRUHNHHSLQJLQD/DQJXDJH*DPH¶Journal of Philosophical Logic 8 (1979); 339-359. 
24 /DQJWRQµ%ORFNLQJDV&RXQWHU-6SHHFK¶; 3. 
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Langton analyses this µJUHDWJLUO¶ speech act as doing at least two things²implicitly 
testifying WKDWJLUOVDUHQ¶WXSWRPXFKZKHQLWFRPHVWRIRRWEDOO and implicitly 
legitimating broader norms that give men a dominant role. And of course the bystander 
µEORFNs¶WKHVHWKLQJVE\FKDOOHQJLQJWKHSUHVXSSRVLWLRQ/DQJWRQJRHVRQWRSUHVHQWD
mode of blocking that functions by explicitating and challenging the presupposition, 
thereby de-DXWKRUL]LQJWKHVSHDNHUVRWKDWKLVKHUVSHHFKDFWPLVILUHV8QOLNH/DQJWRQ¶V
µJUHDWJLUO¶example, in which the objectionable nature of the presupposition is that it is 
false or at least condescending to women, so that de-authorizing it is an appropriate aim; 
in the case of forgiveness my point is not at all that there is anything wrong with the 
content of the presupposition. There LVQ¶W: forgiveness generally presupposes 
blameworthiness. My point is rather that the presupposition, and the implicit assertion of 
blameworthiness that it entails, can all too easily degenerate²especially given that the 
would-be forgiver is emerging from a moral wounding²into serving as a mere vehicle 
for back-door blaming. Under the surreptitious influence of the back-door assertion of 
blameworthiness, an initial attempt at forgiving can unfortunately deteriorate into a mere 
reassertion of the fact that they did wrong. Blame smuggles itself back on set, concealed 
in a cloak of forgiveness²µDFFRPPRGDWHG¶. Thus we can see how the presupposition of 
blameworthiness entails that when one communicates forgiveness one thereby implicitly 
expresses the view that the person is blameworthy. This is an aspect of forgiveness that 
calls for an active repression of the blaming attitude to keep it off-screen where it now 
belongs, if indeed you really are forswearing the blame-feelings it inspires. This brings 
me to the second point²the point about what is typically involved in any forgiver¶V
internal self-disciplinary effort to forswear his blame-feelings. 
 
Now that we are sensitized to the operation of proleptic mechanisms we can look away 
from other-directed forms of causal social construction and turn our gaze inward to the 
first-personal aspect of forgiveness. What one does in forgiving, if I may continue to use 
6WUDZVRQ¶VFKDUDFWHUL]DWLRQZKLFK,WKLQNLVLQGHHGDSWIRUIRUJLYHQHVVLQJHQHUDOLV
forswear blame-feelings towards the wrongdoer foUZKDWVKH¶VGRQH7KDWLVZHcommit 
to drastically reducing such feelings, and if possible relinquishing them altogether. So 
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how do we achieve this? Sometimes it will be easy and spontaneous²the wrongdoer 
repudiates her action and we instantly feel the indignation, annoyance, or hurt simply 
evaporate without effort. In such cases, forgiveness comes upon one passively in the form 
of spontaneous relief from the burdens of blame-feeling. Sometimes, however, it is not at 
all easy and spontaneous. Often, and certainly in the case of more serious wrongdoing, or 
repeated wrongdoing that makes blame-feeing linger and grow from one occasion to the 
next like an intensifying allergic reaction, it is a serious job of work to follow through on 
the forswearing. What does a forgiver do who finds that his blame-feelings do not melt 
away swiftly but instead call for an enduring effort of forswearing? The answer is that he 
will typically, and quite properly, have recourse to a common behavioural technique: he 
will behave as if the blame-feelings have already subsided more than they have, largely 
as a means of causing them to further subside. 7KDWLVWRVD\KH¶OOWU\WRDFWQRUPDODVD
means of helping him bring his emotions into line. Our earlier discussions of other-
directed prolepsis equips us now to recognize this technique of emotional self-discipline 
as one of self-directed prolepsis: the forgiver behaves as if he already had feature F and, 
if successful, he thereby comes to have feature F.25 Forswearing, when it is not easy and 
instead requires on-going emotional and attitudinal self-discipline, employs a strategy of 
reflexive causal moral-social construction. If you like, one performs a completed 
forgiveness on the outside in order to progress the requisite inward change of heart.26 
 
This is on the whole a sound technique. But we can see how it too carries an inherent risk 
of descent into self-deception. Why? Because if I behave as if I have already relinquished 
blame-feeling towards another party, I am precisely not attending to the blame-feelings 
that do in fact persist. Non-attention to such residual feelings is part of the self-
                                                        
25 This is very close to Agnes CalODUG¶VLGHDRIVHOI-addressed proleptic reasons that take 
WKHIRUPRIµVHOI-PDQDJHPHQWUHDVRQV¶&DOODUGµ3UROHSWLF5HDVRQV¶Oxford Studies in 
Metaethics Vol. II (2016) ed. Russ Shafer-Landau); and also somewhat to David 
9HOOHPDQ¶s idea that sometimes in order to embrace an ideal we must pretend to it 
(Vellemanµ0RWLYDWLRQE\,GHDO¶Philosophical Explorations 5/2 (2002); 89-103). But in 
the case I am describing here, the forgiver already embraces the reason and motive to 
forgive; she is simply trying to get her continuing or residual blame-feelings to catch up. 
26 For the related idea that the justification of a speech act of forgiveness may precede the 
requisite change of heart, see Kathryn Norlock, Forgiveness From A Feminist 
Perspective (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2009). 
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constructive technique. I need to ignore them in order that they may subside further, 
staying determinedly out of touch with those feelings pro tem, in order to push ahead 
with the business of forswearing them which involves some successful relinquishing of 
them.27 This methodological denial is a proleptic technique we often rely on, and rightly 
so. But of course this very technique makes it likely that in the event that I cannot in fact 
rid myself of those significant blame-feelings towards the wrongdoer, then I am not well 
placed to see it. Indeed I may be the last to know, for the reason I cannot see it is that ,¶P
too busy doing just what I was meant to be doing if only the technique had worked²
looking the other way, and generally carrying on as if the blame-feelings were already in 
the past. So long as well-functioning forswearing of blame-feeling calls upon the would-
be forgiver to actively ignore and cultivate a methodological denial about her continued 
blame-feelings, then it is obvious that the signature pitfall of this core aspect of any 
effortful forgiveness is self-deception; possibly accompanied by deception of others too, 
notably the wrongdoer, not to mention a likely pattern passive-aggressive reactions to 
them. What starts out as a sensible transitional technique²perhaps even an essential 
one²slows all too easily into a drawn-out performance of bad faith. 
 
Conclusion  
I started with the observation that our attitudes towards forgiveness seem to be conflicted, 
exhibiting a certain habit of idealization on the one hand, and a pessimistic scepticism on 
the other. I have argued, however, that the lesson we should take from these conflicting 
attitudes is that forgiveness rightly inspires ambivalence ± an ambivalence that is 
grounded in deep interpersonal and personal features of what is often involved in 
forgiving someone. Firstly, Gifted Forgiveness involves an operation of proleptic moral 
influence²an other-directed social constructive power that is intrinsically prone to 
deterioration into manipulation, even moral-epistemic domination, especially under 
conditions of inequality. Second, I drew attention to the generic fact that blameworthiness 
                                                        
27 Charles Griswold suggests that a success condition of forswearing is that one has had 
at least a little success already at actually relinquishing the blame-feelings, and this seems 
right, on pain of the commitment being empty²forswearing is more than lip-service. See 
Griswold, Forgiveness: A Philosophical Exploration, (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2007). 
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is presupposed to forgiveness, so that any communication of forgiveness inevitably 
invokes the fact of blameworthiness, with the result that the forgiver may easily find 
herself inadvertently communicating not only forgiveness but also, and perhaps chiefly, 
back-door blame. And, finally, I turned our gaze inwards to the first-personal effort of 
forswearing blame-feelings that constitutes the emotional core of all forgiveness, and I 
observed that wherever the forswearing requires some effort it will tend to call upon 
another kind of prolepsis: a self-directed form of moral-social construction. This 
mechanism depends upon a certain methoGRORJLFDOGHQLDODERXWRQH¶VSHUVLsting blame-
feelings, and so renders the would-be forgiver notably vulnerable to self-deception as 
regards her level of success.  
 
These three different kinds of deterioration in our quite genuine efforts to forgive tend 
towards one or another form of bad faith. Moreover they attend our efforts of forgiveness 
owing to intrinsic features of the practice, rather than accidental aspects of the social 
environment. In particular, I have hoped to make plain that the other-directed prolepsis 
operating within Gifted Forgiveness, and the self-directed prolepsis often involved in the 
effort of forswearing blame-feelings quite generally, together reveal the social 
constructive powers so often at work in forgiving. AQLQFUHDVHGDZDUHQHVVRISRZHU¶V
integral role in these responses, and the specific psychological mechanisms by which it is 
exercised, may help us to watch out for its degenerative tendencies. It also indicates a 
philosophical conception of forgiveness as often involving delicately balanced moral 
powers to be exercised in relation to self and other²a conception that avoids both 
idealization and scepticism, and instead, learning something from each, stabilizes in a 
tender ambivalence.28 
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